Wednesday, September 21, 2011

5 Sources

1)http://hw4sm7zh5k.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=HOUSING+BOOM&rft.jtitle=Forbes&rft.au=Kennth+L+Fisher&rft.date=2007-02-26&rft.issn=0015-6914&rft.volume=179&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=110&rft.externalDBID=FBR&rft.externalDocID=1214653111

Abstract:
For months now the debate has been over whether America will have a hard landing or soft landing, the answer hinging on how big 2007's housing disaster turns out to be. Well, there won't be any housing disaster. We won't have a landing at all, soft or hard. Right now the U.S. and global economies are both accelerating. You can see right through the housing crash story by looking at the prices of housing stocks. The market knows what the economic worrywarts do not, which is that the housing sector is already making a comeback. In the last six months housing stocks are up 24%, well ahead of the overall market. If housing were destined to fall apart in 2007 these stocks wouldn't be so strong now. Housing sales are up in the last few months, not down, and inventories are lower than six months ago. The market is accelerating, not landing. This is true not just in housing but also pretty much across the board.


Abstract
Housing markets in the US and Canada are similar in many respects, but each has fared quite differently since the onset of the financial crisis. A comparison of the two markets suggests that relaxed lending standards likely played a critical role in the US housing bust. Some observers blame monetary policy for lowering interest rates over 2002-2005, pushing up housing demand, increasing residential investment, and raising housing prices. In this view, the monetary-policy-induced housing boom set the stage for an inevitable housing bust. Canada and the US experienced significant increases in house prices and residential investment from 2000 to 2006, though prices in Canada appreciated more slowly. The Canada-US comparison suggests the low interest rate policy of the central banks in both countries contributed to the housing boom over 2001-2006 and that a relaxation of lending standards in the US was the critical factor in setting the stage for the housing bust.
2) http://hw4sm7zh5k.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Why+didn%27t+Canada%27s+housing+market+go+bust%3F&rft.jtitle=Economic+Commentary+%28Cleveland%29&rft.au=MacGee%2C+James&rft.date=2009-09-01&rft.pub=Federal+Reserve+Bank+of+Cleveland&rft.issn=0428-1276&rft.spage=1&rft.externalDBID=ECC&rft.externalDocID=216915077

Abstract
Housing markets in the US and Canada are similar in many respects, but each has fared quite differently since the onset of the financial crisis. A comparison of the two markets suggests that relaxed lending standards likely played a critical role in the US housing bust. Some observers blame monetary policy for lowering interest rates over 2002-2005, pushing up housing demand, increasing residential investment, and raising housing prices. In this view, the monetary-policy-induced housing boom set the stage for an inevitable housing bust. Canada and the US experienced significant increases in house prices and residential investment from 2000 to 2006, though prices in Canada appreciated more slowly. The Canada-US comparison suggests the low interest rate policy of the central banks in both countries contributed to the housing boom over 2001-2006 and that a relaxation of lending standards in the US was the critical factor in setting the stage for the housing bust.

3) http://hw4sm7zh5k.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Sluggish+housing+market+making+economists+jittery&rft.jtitle=New+Hampshire+Business+Review&rft.au=Bob+Sanders&rft.date=2007-12-21&rft.issn=0164-8152&rft.volume=29&rft.issue=28&rft.spage=1&rft.externalDBID=NHBR&rft.externalDocID=1422212751
Abstract
The injury - the scar across the economic landscape - is the deepening housing slump, sparked by the subprime loan crisis. Adjustable loans with teaser rates made to those with a questionable credit history were bundled and sold on the market to speculators so the mortgage company originating the loan didn't have to worry about it being paid back. The turndown couldn't have come at a worse time, with the paper mills shut down or shutting down, there also is less of a market for scrap wood, though that may be offset by the demand for wood-fired energy plants that are coming on line.

4)http://hw4sm7zh5k.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Short-Term+Own-Price+and+Spillover+Effects+of+Distressed+Residential+Properties%3A+The+Case+of+a+Housing+Crash&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Real+Estate+Research&rft.au=Nasser+Daneshvary&rft.au=Terrence+M+Clauretie&rft.au=Ahmad+Kader&rft.date=2011-06-01&rft.issn=0896-5803&rft.volume=33&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=179&rft.externalDBID=JRR&rft.externalDocID=2431720631

Abstract
Most previous empirical studies of price spillover effects of foreclosure on no-default transactions are based on data from a stable housing-market period. This study uses transactions for 2008 from a housing market with a relatively large number of real estate owned (REO) sales / foreclosures. The overall results indicate that: (1) REO and in the process of foreclosure properties have the same spillover effects, but short sales do not produce a spillover effect; (2) models that control for the overall market trend produce smaller spillover effects; (3) the marginal effect of an REO is 1%; (4) the cumulative effects of multiple distressed neighbors can be as severe as 8%; and (5) excluding transactions of homes that were sold under distress from the sample increases the estimated marginal spillover effect to about 2% and the cumulative effects to about 21%

5) http://hw4sm7zh5k.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Housing+crashes+through+floor&rft.jtitle=Crain%27s+Chicago+Business&rft.au=Alby+Gallun&rft.date=2008-01-21&rft.issn=0149-6956&rft.volume=31&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=1&rft.externalDBID=CCHI&rft.externalDocID=1435704021

Abstract
The housing downturn, longer and deeper than most people expected, has rippled through the local economy, hitting businesses like Warrenville-based Neumann Homes Inc., which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in November, and USC Corp. of Chicago, which saw its third-quarter profit plunge 95% amid weak demand for its wallboard, a key residential construction material.

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